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Abstract
In the competitive labor markets, labor is hired and paid based on their value of 
marginal product. However, when we observe and compare wages between top level 
managers, difference in those wages are very large. High wage differentials are 
needed to induce the incentive to provide substantial effort from the start of their ca-
reers. Structure of the marginal payoffs in professional tennis tournaments does not 
correspond to tournament theory. Marginal payoffs increase, but at the decreasing 
rate, and in the final round, final marginal payoff drops. Percentage change in mar-
ginal payoff is larger in the semi-finals than in the finals. Along the same lines, top 
four finishers receive less than 50% of the total purse, around 40%. Finally, output 
from regressions on total purse and marginal payoff (spread) show mixed results. In 
some instances players’ effort is related to the purse instead of marginal payoff, 
which contradicts the theory. In other cases, players’ effort is dependent on both 
variables, purse and marginal payoff. Thus, results are rather inconclusive. 
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1. Introduction
Literature on tournament models is rather small, but growing. More recent publica-
tions are mostly oriented toward empirical analysis, testing the models developed 
by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), O’Keeffe, Viscusi and 
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Zeckhauser (1984), and Rosen (1986). Tournament theory was developed on the 
simple observation that workers in a firm, in some instances, are not paid on the basis 
of value of the marginal product, but some lower amount at the early stages of their 
careers, and then, higher amount at the later stages of their career. Basically, using 
sport’s environment as an example, individuals enter as minor league contestants, 
and the best contestants are promoted into major league. Once in the major league, 
their pay is again based on the performance relative to other individuals, rather than 
solely on the output. For instance, the difference between chief executive salary and 
the salary of a vice president is extensive. More explicitly, the difference in the pay 
of chief executives and their immediate subordinates seems to be greater than the 
difference in their abilities or outputs (Dye, 1984). This is suggesting that chief ex-
ecutives are the winners of a contest and therefore they receive first prize, while their 
subordinates are in a sense losers, and receive loser’s share. It is important to realize 
that the difference between the first prize and the second prize, or the spread, will 
determine how much effort individual is willing to supply, given his talent and the 
ability. Contestants who succeed in attaining high ranks in elimination career ladders 
rest on their laurels in attempting to climb higher, unless top-ranking prizes are given 
a disproportionate weight in the purse (Rosen, 1986).
This paper is analyzing the tournament model in another sporting event, men’s profes-
sional tennis. Professional tennis tournaments perhaps fit the concept of a tournament 
model better than any other sport since they are based on a concept of single elimi-
nation, winners move forward with a chance to obtain a higher reward, while losers 
receive their loser’s share of total purse. Spread between prizes exists and it should be 
structured in a way to motivate players’ performance and the total quality of play. On 
one hand, players try to maximize their utility subject to some effort level constraint. 
As they increase the effort level, costs associated with it will increase as well. By 
equating the marginal cost of additional effort supply to the marginal benefit, which 
is a higher prize that they can obtain, they would maximize the utility. On the other 
hand, tournament owner, or the organizer will behave just like a firm. For simplicity, 
let’s assume a competitive environment. Tennis players are the inputs for the produc-
tion process, a match. players’ inputs are their forehands, serves, drop-shots and so 
on. Owner’s goal is to maximize his profits subject to a purse constraint. Purse will 
determine who enters the tournament which is actually very important for his revenue 
stream, since public, TV contracts, and sponsors decide to contribute before the event 
starts, once they know, or once they can forecast who will play, not during the tour-
nament. In some smaller tournaments that might not be the case. Thus, owner of the 
resources will try to maximize his profits by manipulating total purse. Question than 
arises from this analysis; why should the owner of the tournament be concerned about 
the spread and, indirectly, the effort level of the players since major percent of his total 
revenue comes in before the tournament starts? Sponsors invest before the tournament 
starts and the fees depend on the tournament’s exposure to the audience, public in 
general purchases tickets before the event starts in general to hedge against sold-out Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
Zb. rad. Ekon. fak. Rij. • 2007 • vol. 25 • sv. 1 • 83-111   85
problem and ability to see their favorite players, and finally, television managers do 
not pay to the owners based on the viewership after the tournament, but before the 
tournament. In a sense, it is a risky investment by the television, sponsors, and public 
as well. Tournaments do price discriminate when selling tickets to the public. Usually, 
ticket prizes increase as the time of the day increases or as the rounds left to be played 
in a tournament decrease. Reason for this is that higher ranked players are scheduled to 
play later in a day, and it is assumed that later rounds will present better matches where 
seeds are suppose to play against each other. With all this in mind, tournament owners 
should worry about setting the correct spread, which will in turn cause players to fully 
invest their resources and provide quality play, for the following reason. Owners of the 
tournament will try to maximize their profits by estimating their revenue over a long 
period of time, not just one tournament. In a Fischerian sense, long-run profits will be 
as important as the short-run profits. Thus, owners will try to build a solid reputation 
by providing consistently good service and entertainment. The process is similar to 
the process when firm is developing a brand name. Efficiently developed spread will 
perhaps make players supply optimal amount of effort, which will produce high qual-
ity and entertaining duels. Happy fans and high ratings will definitely secure good 
contracts for next year’s event.
2. Empirical tests of tournaments
Empirical analysis of tournament models is rather small. The most obvious reason 
for this fact is that it is difficult to apply tournament theory model in the firm’s 
environment and produce some meaningful results, since it is difficult to measure 
worker’s effort level in firm’s setting. Small number of papers rather examined the 
compensation of corporate executives for evidence of rewards based upon own firm 
performance relative to that of other firms in the same industry (Jensen and Mur-
phy, 1990; Gibbons and Murphy, 1990; Antle and Smith, 1986). Even though, these 
papers confirm that relative performance matters, which is an important feature of 
tournaments, their work did not actually test the theory of tournament model. Main, 
O’Reilly, and Wade (1993), pioneered with their work in testing tournament model 
in actual, firm, setting. Also, sport arenas do provide us with numerous examples of 
tournament setting, in which effort by players could easily be measured, since it is 
based on some rank, place, lowest time, or highest score. 
Main et al. (1993) provided a study that reports the results of an empirical investigation 
of executive compensation. Their results are consistent with the operation of tourna-
ments, or the concept of ever larger rewards to motivate those at the highest organiza-
tional levels. They found that for the years 1980-84, CEOs’ (chief executive officers) 
earned the level of pay (base plus bonus) that was some 141% greater than that enjoyed 
by their immediate subordinates. They also found that the ratio of pay between levels 
seems to increase markedly as one moves up the corporate hierarchy.  Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Study done by Knober and Thurman (1994) comes very close to the actual, firm 
setting since they use data from production of broiler chickens. They found, that 
growers respond to different payment structures with different levels of effort. Thus 
evidence shows that incremental rewards, not absolute levels, determine effort. In 
other words, changes in the level of prizes that leave prize differentials unchanged 
will not affect performance. Secondly, Knober and Thurman found that in mixed 
tournaments, more able players will choose less risky strategies than less able play-
ers. Last empirical result suggests that tournament organizers will attempt to handi-
cap players of unequal ability or homogenize tournaments to avoid the disincentive 
effects of mixed tournaments.
Further support of the tournament model is found in the empirical investigation of 
professional golf tournaments played in the United States and in Europe (Ehrenberg 
and Bognanno, 1990a, 1990b). Both papers test the same hypothesis using different 
data from pGA Tour. Here the structure of the tournament, the outcome of player’s 
actions, and features of the environment such as weather and course rating could be 
observed. Major hypothesis of both papers is based on the Lazear and Rosen (1981) 
and Rosen (1986) theoretical work regarding prize structure. Test results are the 
following: more difficult courses, either higher par or longer yardage, are associ-
ated with high scores; the better the player, which is measured either by his scoring 
average on all rounds played during the Tour year, or by average number of strokes 
per round worse (+) or better (-) than par for all rounds during the Tour year (both 
variables measure player’s ability), the lower the player’s score will be. 
Moving from golf competition to car racing competition, an interesting study on 
tournaments model was conducted by Becker and Huselid (1992). Auto racing, in 
this case they used the data from NASCAR and IMSA races, is characterized by 
across-tournament variation in both the size and distribution of the prizes. The re-
sults show that increasing the absolute prize differential going to the top finishers 
increased driver performance. Results show that drivers did take more risks as the 
spread increased, but only when the payoffs were very high.
Finally, we move from car racing to foot races, which was a study on tournament 
model done by Maloney and McCormick (1994). Foot races are more individually 
oriented than car races, thus less organization is required. Empirical results are the 
following; the longer the race, the slower the time per mile. When the average dis-
tance between top finishers is large, times for all finishers, even first place, are slower. 
In other words, overall times are slower when the finish of the race is not close. Also, 
the less concentrated the payout of the purse, the slower is the field. That is, when 
a few runners receive the bulk of the money, the finish times are faster. It is worth 
mentioning the fact that above study used an open, not a close event for analysis. 
When prizes increase, authors found that in an open event like a foot race, individu-
als already in the race will run faster, but also higher prizes will attract a faster field. 
LBO’s and corporate takeovers cause firm’s managers to behave like they are com-Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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peting in the open tournament where the threat of turnover is always present. It is not 
certain that participants of the closed working environment will respond in the same 
manner, as participants of the open working environment, to the wage changes.
3. Data source and variables
The empirical analysis of this paper was performed analyzing the data set provided 
by the ATP organization, with main offices in Ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. This site 
has been the home for ATp since their inauguration in 1990. All the available data is 
stored on the IBM’s AS/400 model 45. Data available through the system is on cur-
rent rankings and the prize money, ranking history by player, head-to-head competi-
tion, tournament history/winners, singles activity by player (wins/losses), doubles 
activity by player (wins/losses), and win/loss standings in ranking order. Most of this 
data is collected at the site, either by the chair umpire or the ATp analyst. Besides 
providing statistics from the ATp tournaments, ATp also provides match and players 
statistics from the Davis Cup matches and Grand Slam Tournaments.
All the data was supplied by the Association of Tennis professionals (ATp), with 
headquarters in ponte Vedra Beach, Florida. Data consists of 169 professional ten-
nis tournaments played on the ATp Tour during 1992 and 1993 seasons. In terms of 
tournament structure and marginal payoffs, nothing has changed since. Tournaments 
differ in their size regarding a draw sheet or the number of players participating. 
There are four different draw sizes, 32 draw, 48 draw, 64 draw, and 128 draw, which 
is a typical draw size for the four Grand Slam tournaments. However, the above draw 
sizes include the rounds in tournaments where players do not have to face an oppo-
nent in the first round. They have, so called, bye. For instance, Lipton Tournament in 
Key Biscayne, Florida, has a draw of 128, but only 96 players do play, which means 
that 32 players, seeds, have byes in the first round. These players do collect a check 
for advancing into second round without playing. In a sense, they receive a bonus for 
showing up at the tournament. Since they do not play, they do not supply any effort 
level to move into second round. This would cause a measurement error, and it is nec-
essary to adjust draws for this problem. Thus, there are 121 32-draws, 14 48-draws, 
1 53-draw, 20 56-draws, 3 64-draws, 2 96 draws and 8 128-draws. Multiplying the 
number of draws with the draw size and adding them all together, I have 7,125 ob-
servations. The data set is divided in two subsets. First one is Tourneys Data Set, and 
this set consists of all the relevant information regarding a match play. Second subset 
is called prizes Data Set, and it contains tournament information. Variables located 
in Tourneys Data Set are the following: date, round(there is a maximum of seven 
rounds), ownrank-current player’s ranking, name 1- player’s name, win/lose-W for 
a player if he wins and L in the case he loses, opprank-opponent’s current ranking, 
oname 2-opponent’s name, time-duration of the match, def-retirements or defaults Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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or no-show, SS1-1st set score, SS1O-1st set score for the opponent, or the number of 
games won, SS2, SS2O, SS3, SS30, SS4, SS40, SS5, SS5O-same as SS1 and SS1O, 
just different sets. In most cases matches are played two out of three sets or best of 
three, and sometimes, three out of five sets, or best of five. Variable FORMAT takes 
on value 1 if the match is played as best of three, and 0 if the match is played as best 
of five. TB1-tiebreak result in the first set, TB1O-first set tiebreak result for the op-
ponent, TB2, TB2O, TB3, TB3O, TB4, TB4O, TB5, TB5O-same as TB1 and TB1O, 
just in different sets. ACES1 - total number of aces in a match. Aces are serves that 
returnee can not touch, DFS1-total number of double faults per match, or server 
missing both serves, BKpTS-number of break points faced (played), or server is one 
point away from losing his serve, BREAKS-break points converted, or server loses 
his serve. In professional tennis matches, speed of the ball generated by a serve is 
usually in excess of 100 mph. With some degree of accuracy, having a serve is an ad-
vantage, similar to having white figures in chess matches. BKPTS could be used as a 
measure of effort level. If both players fight hard we should expect to see the points 
in every game to be very condensed. Optimal reflection of a close match would be 
information on total number of deuce points per game. Since this statistic was not 
available, number of break points accomplished by both players is a good substitute. 
BKpTS is derived in a way so it measures the output of both players, not only one 
player. Thus, I took the minimum number of break points in the match, or in other 
words, it is a paired number of break points in a match. Thus, in the matches where 
only one player dominates, he has break points and eventually breaks, those break 
points are not included in the sample used in regressions, and only break points that 
match with opponent’s break points are used. It is possible that in the close matches, 
loser has more break points than the winner, however less actual breaks. Number of 
break points accomplished by the losing player should cause the match to be closer. 
play1-1st service points played including service aces, or the total number of points 
played after making first serve, Play1W-1st serve points won, play1O-1st serves played 
by the opponent, play1OW-1st serves played and won by the opponent, play2-second 
serves played including service aces, play2W-second serves won, play2O-2nd serve 
played by the opponent, play2OW-second serve won by the opponent, play-total of 
service games played, playO-total of return games played. 
Second data subset, prizes Data Set consists of: date, tourney-tournament name, 
class-either an ATp event, Davis Cup, or Grand Slam tournament, purse-total tourna-
ment prize in US dollars, surface-either clay, hard, grass, or indoor carpet, location, 
points 1-8 for each round and for winner. Maximum is eight in the case of a Grand 
Slam tournament. prize 1-8 is a dollar amount given to players for each round plus 
to a winner. Maximum number of recipients is 8 in Grand Slam tournaments. Vari-
ables CLAY, GRASS, HARD, and CARpET represented by the variable SURFACE 
are possible types of surface on which ATp Tour tournaments are played. These are 
dummy variables that take on values 0 and/or 1, and HARD is the base surface vari-
able. RANKWGHT is a variable that measures the quality of the field, or the ability Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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of the players in the draw. It is simply a sum of players’ ranks, or ΣI (ownranki + op-
pranki) where i=1,..., 128 for a Grand Slam tournament. Ownrank and opprank stand 
for own ranking and opponents ranking. RANKDIFF is the absolute value of differ-
ence in ranking between two players. It is measured as |ownrank-opprank|, and it 
measures player’s ability with respect to his opponent ability. SpREAD is a variable 
that reflects the difference between two prizes. PTSPRD stands for the points spread, 
and is found in a similar fashion as SpREAD. Variable UpSET is a dummy variable 
that takes the value of zero if ownrank>opprank and opponent loses, and it takes the 
value of 1 if ownrank<opprank and opponent still loses the match. DRAW stands for 
the size of the tournament in the terms of the number of players participating. For 
instance, if DRAW = 128, there are 128 players participating in a tournament. Vari-
able similar to DRAW was created, FIELD, to take into consideration byes. For in-
stance, we could have a 64 draw but only 53 or 56 players in it. Thus mean value for 
FIELD should be less than the mean value for DRAW. Variable SpREAD needs 
more  explaining  than  originally  provided.  SpREAD  was  derived  according  to 
Rosen’s derivation (1986). According to Rosen, value of maintaining eligibility at 
any stage, spread, is the sure prize the player has guaranteed by surviving that long, 
plus the discounted sum of successive interrank rewards that might be achieved in 
the future matches. In other words, the incentives are determined by the discounted 
sum of interrank spreads. Thus, we can write, SpREAD = (EXpECTED pRICE 
DUE TO ADVANCEMENT - NEXT ROUND LOSER’S pAY). SpREAD variable 
will  differ  according  to  the  size  of  the  draw. Another  important  component  of 
SpREAD variable is the probability assigned to the advancement to the next round. 
By looking at the draw sheet, player can tell only with certainty who will be his op-
ponent in the first round. He can only predict who can be his next opponents in the 
up-coming rounds. There are instances where players do not know their opponent 
even in the first round. This will be the case when player waits for the opponent who 
comes from the qualifying tournament. When the draw is made, usually a week be-
fore the tournament, he does not know his opponent, only the day before the start of 
the tournament the draw is fully formed. There are, also, cases when a player has a 
bye, does not face an opponent in the first round, so in the second round he knows 
that his opponent will be the winner of the first round match. Another problem with 
constructing a SpREAD variable is the question of ex-ante or ex-post observation. If 
we look at the draw after the tournament is completed, ex-post, all the matches are 
completed and I know with certainty who played who, and what was the outcome. 
Thus, ex-post, probabilities that player faces certain opponents are known. On the 
other hand, tournaments are played ex-ante. players will decide to enter the draw 
depending on the purse level. Once they decide to enter, the level of their effort will 
depend on the immediate spread, and the expected payoff of additional advance-
ment. But, ex-ante, they will not know their opponents, and thus, they will not have 
perfect information in forming some probability levels. For example, player A’s draw 
might show a likely match against a first seed in the second round and he accord-Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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ingly sets his effort level, assuming high marginal cost, at least in the second round. 
But if first seed lost before A player played his first round match, his effort level will 
change since his payoff changes. Marginal benefit of additional investment beyond 
round 1 suddenly becomes greater than the marginal cost of the investment. Thus, 
players will assign very little importance, or weight, to the later stages of the draw, 
and more importance, weight, to the early stages of the draw. As they, players, move 
forward through the draw, they will be updating their forecast of future opponents 
and assigning new probabilities to winning. Since data does not provide scheduling 
time of matches, in the perfect setting best players would take the court last, but due 
to contractual obligations towards ticket holders and most of all, TV, we know that 
this is not the case, I am limited to observe the draws from completed tournaments. 
The most approachable way to form variable SpREAD according to Rosen’s theo-
retical work would be to assign a probability of 1/2 to each additional round. This is 
an accurate estimate even if we deal with heterogeneous players, since probabilities 
might differ between matches, but across the tournament they will average out, and 
we should observe closer matches as we move toward final round. Thus, variable 
SPREAD for the first round in a 32 draw tournament is derived as (P5-p6) + 0.5(p4-
p5)+ 0.52(p3-p4)+ 0.53(p2-p3)+ 0.54(p1-p2). Variable SpREAD3 represents, let say in a 
32 draw setting, the marginal expected prize for winning 1st round. SpREAD4 stands 
for the second round spread and expected future earnings from the rest of the avail-
able rounds. SpREAD4 is thus equal to (p4-p5) + 0.5(p3-p4)+ 0.52(p2-p3)+ 0.53(p1-
p2), and so on to SPREAD7, which would be the final match, where spread is equal 
to (p1-p2). In a 64 draw tournament, SPREAD2 will reflect the first round spread, and 
in a 128 draw tournament, SPREAD1 corresponds to the first round match. Two 
important questions arise from variable SpREAD. One is, do players really look at 
the expected prize from winning the whole tournament, or are they concerned only 
with the first, perhaps, second match that they will be playing. The other one is, how 
accurate is to set probabilities of wining every round to be equal to 1/2. We know that 
200th player in the World has less than 1/2 probability of beating 1st player in the 
World, and if that is the case, what would be the right way to forecast correct prob-
ability. probability of winning will not only depend on the ability level, but also on 
the type of surface, two players past match record, latest results by each player, and 
many other exogenous factors that can not be measured. These are the problems that 
this paper addresses, but further research is needed for an analytical explanation. 
pRZDIF stands for prize difference, and it is created to see if players do perhaps care 
only about immediate reward. pRZDIF is created in the same way as the variable 
SpREAD, excluding probabilities necessary for advancement in the next round. 
PRZDIF1 is the prize difference between loser’s prize in the first round and loser’s 
prize in the second round. In a 32 draw setting, pRZDIF3 = p5-p6, and so on. In a 32 
draw tourney, pRZDIF7 would equal the spread p1-p2. Tennis players’ investment 
level depends on the number of points they can obtain by winning additional round, 
as well (see section on ATp Tour). points are relevant variable in players’ formation Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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of effort because points are correlated with ranking, and higher ranking represents 
easier entry into bigger, richer, tournaments and better endorsement deals. Thus, 
point-spread (PTSPRD) will also influence the level of investment. Effort level will 
be represented by several variables. TIME is a variable that represents the actual 
time of a match in the tournament. Data set provided for me by the ATp Tour infor-
mation center contained several errors related to the time of a match. I had to make 
a personal judgment when to drop the matches with too short time of a match or too 
long time of a match with respect to number of games played. Thus, the number of 
observations decreased from 6714 to 5195. The argument for TIME variable is that 
longer matches are associated with higher effort level. problem with this measure-
ment is the fact that matches are played on different surfaces, which will affect the 
time of the match. Thus, it is important to adjust for the surface characteristic, or 
results may favor clay court matches regarding effort level, but disfavor grass court 
matches. To  solve  for  the  problem  I  created  a  variable  GAMES  and  pOINTS. 
GAMES stands for the total number of games played in the match divided by the 
number of maximum possible sets. For instance, in the best-of-five match, total num-
ber of games is divided by five. POINTS stands for the total number of points played 
divided by the maximum number of possible sets played. pOINTS come closest to 
the measurement of effort, since total number of games could produce misleading 
results. For instance, 6/2, 6/1 match produces low number of games, but both players 
could have had supplied a great deal of effort. However, only one of them got all the 
breaks. TIME, as well as BKpTS variables would take this problem into consider-
ation. Variable GAMES was created by simply observing the final result and sum-
ming up all the games in the match and divided by the maximum number of sets that 
could have been played (FORMAT). Variables play and play0 provide also informa-
tion on total number of service games and total number of returning games. pOINTS 
are a sum of variables play1, play1O, play2, and play2O divided by the maximum 
number of sets or a FORMAT. Finally, variable ppG, which stands for points per 
game was created to measure some level of effort, as well. ppG is derived by divid-
ing pOINTS by the GAMES for each match. By holding the number of games con-
stant, it would be interesting to see how level of effort changes as the number of 
points change.
4. Empirical analysis and results
Theoretical work laid out by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Rosen (1986), and other au-
thors provides us with several hypotheses that could be empirically tested.
From the above paragraph several hypotheses could develop. First, as the spread 
level increases, effort level should increase. Coefficient should be positive. Second, 
as the purse level increases, number of high-ability players that enter a tournament Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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increases. Thus, the probability to enter will be affected by the purse, since purse af-
fects cost-benefit analysis of each player. Coefficient should be positive. Along the 
same lines, we can test the relationship between income effect and the entry deci-
sion. players with large prize earnings, due to income effect, will enter lower number 
of tournaments than players with low prize earnings. Coefficient should be nega-
tive. Third, theory suggests that spread level should be increasing at the increasing 
rate. Spread between winner’s prize and finalist’s prize should be the greatest, and 
it should be narrowing down towards first round. As the number of rounds left to be 
played decreases, spread level should be increasing. Coefficient should be negative.
This paper addresses tournament model by observing data collected from the pro-
fessional tennis tournaments. players participating on the ATp Tour differ in their 
abilities. That is reflected by the rankings. It is a very rare instance among top 200 
players that two of them share a common position. It is much more common to see 
players having the same number of points in the very low ranking places. ATp ranks 
about 1,000 players. Thus, we can conclude that as we move towards the top on the 
ranking list, ability becomes greater but at the same time more scarce. ATp Tour 
players, therefore, make a heterogeneous sample with abilities that are relatively 
known among players and tournament organizers. It does happen every year that 
some player has much greater ability than his ranking reflects, and as an “outsider” 
he does well, perhaps due to his unique style, or a fast serve. But this asymmetry will 
persist only in the short-run. His ranking will immediately reflect his performance 
and new information about him will become available. Thus, in the long-run, players 
and organizers know each others abilities with a great deal of certainty. Moving up 
or down in the rankings is rather slow, gradual process. Almost no one starts without 
any ranking and reaches top hundred in a year or two. Jumping from below 200th 
ranking into top 100 in a year is considered a tremendous task. We can conclude with 
certainty that sample of players in this data set is heterogeneous with known abilities. 
Since abilities are rather known to organizers they will not face the problem of mixed 
tournament, or problem of “climbing,” while they are preparing a draw. Players are 
selected into a draw based on their ranking. If there is a 32-draw, which accepts 24 
players directly and 8 qualifiers, top 24 players from the ATP Tour rank-list, which is 
updated weekly, will have a priority, and other players will have to qualify through a 
qualifying tournament, which might also have 32-draw.
This paper’s objective is to test the following hypothesis:
1)  Spread is increasing at the linear or increasing rate as the number of rounds left to 
be played decreases, but in the final round, spread should have a distinct jump
2)  Top 4 ranks (2 semi-finalists, finalist, and the winner) should receive at least 
50% of the total purse available in a tournament
3)  As the spread level changes (increases), effort level will change (increase)Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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5. Results
Let us first turn our attention to the descriptive statistics. Table 1 provides us with 
the match statistics on first moments, standard deviations, minimum, and maximum 
values of the variables used in the regressions. Thus, information is based on 6,715 
dual matches.
Table 1: Means,  standard  deviations,  minimum,  and  maximum  for  regression   
coefficients
Variable Mean Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Round 3,3048 1,3498 1,0000 7,0000
Time 103,3037 34,9212 38,0000 326,0000
Rankwght 173,9419 143,1194 3,0000 1161,0000
Rankdiff 80,5635 103,6715 1,0000 875,0000
Aces1 9,0231 6,5040 0,0000 49,0000
Dfs1 6,3374 4,0806 0,0000 36,0000
Brkpts 14,7352 6,7950 1,0000 55,0000
Breaks 6,0150 2,9079 0,0000 23,0000
points 161,4183 58,3941 60,0000 485,0000
Games 24,4079 7,6863 11,0000 58,0000
ppg 6,5548 0,6361 3,6667 10,1053
Format 3,3002 0,7144 3,0000 5,0000
Field 54,2268 33,4783 32,0000 128,0000
pdpurse 733,1756 803,7764 97,5000 2959,2800
Draw 58,0718 35,0428 32,0000 128,0000
Spread 23,4046 26,0933 3,3938 268,5060
Arankwgh 179,6471 59,2152 60,1290 332,8000
Mssteps 1,2889 0,0682 1,2411 1,4650
Note: n = 6715
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by ATP Tour offices, 1995.
Variables that represent the effort level should perhaps be mentioned briefly. TIME 
variable ranges from 38 minutes to 326 minutes, or from about half-an-hour to about 
five hours and forty three minutes. It is most likely that later information comes from 
the match that had FORMAT 5. Average time it took to play a match during 1992 and 
1993 ATp Tour was about two hours and twelve minutes. Variable GAMES shows 
a range from eleven games to fifty eight games, with a mean of about twenty four 
games. Minimum number of games should be 12 (6/0, 6/0), however minimum of Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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eleven games reflects the default that occurred during a match, thus match was not 
finished. This is interesting information. We have some defaults in the matches in my 
data, but it seems that players default only when a large number of games have been 
played already, match result is close. This suggests that defaults are rather related to 
the player’s injury than to a “giving-up” problem, which is accepted, for instance in 
chess games, but not in tennis. If we compare the means of time and games (103.304 
minutes, 24 games), it turns out that it takes, on average, about 4 minutes per game. 
Minimum number of pOINTS played in a match is 60, while maximum is 485, and 
the mean is about 161 points. If we compare average time of a match with the aver-
age number of points played in a match, it can be observed that it takes about 60 
seconds per point, or 1 minute to complete a point. Even though these numbers are 
reasonable, comparing variables GAMES and pOINTS to the variable TIME, results 
will however produce biased estimates since TIME variable consists of the total time 
it takes to complete a match, not the actual time it takes to complete a match, which 
is much shorter. For example, Pete Sampras defeated Goran Ivanisevic in the finals 
of ‘94 Wimbledon 7/6, 7/6, 6/4, and while the match lasted about two hours, time 
counted when ball was in play, or the actual time of play was only 8 minutes. players 
do have 25 seconds break between the points and 90 seconds break at the change-
over. players played on average about seven points per game (ppG), with minimum 
of four points and maximum of 10 points per game. 
pDpURSE, or a total prize available for the singles competition, has a mean of 
733.1756, or $733, 175.6. Minimum purse offered for singles play was 97.500 or 
$97,500 and maximum purse offered was 2959.28 or $2,959,280. On the other hand, 
SpREAD level, or the marginal expected prize, has a mean of $23,404. The low-
est SpREAD is equal to $3,393.75, and the highest SpREAD available is equal to 
$268,506.
Table 2 illustrates descriptive statistics at the tournament level. This information is 
thus based on the 168 tournaments. 
Variable BYES represents direct advancement into the second round without play, 
usually given to seeded players. Maximum number of byes assigned in the sample 
of tournaments was 32. It is interesting to point out that total number of double faults 
across tournaments is lower, on average, than the total number of aces. Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics from tournaments’ generated data
Variable  Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
 Byes  2,7797 5,8926 0,0000 32,0000
 Field  42,1726 22,2538 32,0000 128,0000
 pdpurse  471,4829 544,5654 97,5000 2959,2800
 Draw  44,9523 24,8412 32,0000 128,0000
 Rankwght  6952,5000 3779,6600 1812,0000 22839,0000
 Rankdiff  3220,1400 1956,3800 932,0000 12331,0000
 Aces  360,6547 333,0848 93,0000 2217,0000
 Dfs  261,9960 153,8394 163,3025 907,4551
 Brkpts  200,8630 169,2468 91,0000 1082,0000
 Breaks  240,4226 192,0514 114,0000 1219,0000
 points  6451,9300 5720,4000 3710,0000 33153,0000
 Games  975,5892 806,5902 571,0000 4597,0000
 Arankwgh  179,6471 59,2152 60,1290 332,8000
 Mssteps  1,2289 0,0681 1,2410 1,4650
Note: n = 168
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by ATP Tour offices, 1995.
This result, perhaps, explains the quality of players involved in the professional tour-
naments.
5.1. Test of hypothesis 1
First hypothesis says, spread level is increasing at the constant (linear) or increasing 
rate as the number of rounds left to be played decreases, and in the final round, spread 
level should have a distinct jump from lower rounds’ spreads. Theory suggests that 
amount of increase in spread will depend on the players’ risk preference. If the partici-
pants are risk neutral a constant spread is sufficient from second place down, or up to 
the finals, while in the finals, a larger interrank spread is required. If the participants 
are risk averse, the spread level should be increasing at an increasing rate with an even 
larger increment between first and second place. As Rosen points out, the spread has 
to be increasing to “buy off “survivor’s risk aversion and maintain their interest in ad-
vancing to higher ranks (1986). By observing following tables we see that the structure 
of spreads and prizes in professional tennis tournaments does not perfectly fit into the 
theory. To make things easier, we created two tables, which show percentage differ-
ences between means of different spreads and prizes for 32, 64, and 128 draws. Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Table 3: Means and percentage differences between means for SpREADi 
Variable Mean32 % D Mean64 % D Mean128 % D
SpREAD1         22,3920  
SpREAD2     16,3200   36,9880 39,4600
SpREAD3 8,9610   26,4160 38,2222 61,1710 39,5300
SpREAD4 13,2610 32,4300 41,0490 35,6400 98,2340 37,7300
SpREAD5 18,2810 27,4600 59,5090 31,0200 147,5680 33,4300
SpREAD6 22,3830 18,3333 76,9000 22,6100 198,9380 25,8200
SpREAD7 20,7040 8,1000 74,6260 3,0500 197,8340 0,5600
Note: i = 1,...,7., and DRAW = 32, 64, 128 
	 Mean32 stands for the means where DRAW = 32; Mean64 stands for the means where   
DRAW = 64; Mean128 stands for the means where DRAW = 128.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by ATp Tour, 1995.
Table 4: Means and percentage differences between means for pRZDIFi 
Variable Mean32 %	D Mean64 %	D Mean128 %	D
pRIZDIF1         3,8977  
pRIZDIF2     3,1111   6,4403 39,1300
pRIZDIF3 2,3310   5,8920 47,1900 12,0540 46,8800
pRIZDIF4 4,1210 43,4400 11,2940 47,8300 24,4490 50,7000
pRIZDIF5 7,0890 41,8700 21,0590 46,3700 48,0990 49,1700
pRIZDIF6 12,0310 41,0700 39,5870 46,8000 100,0210 51,9100
pRIZDIF7 20,7050 41,8900 74,6260 46,9500 197,8340 49,4400
Note: i = 1,...,7., and DRAW = 32, 64, 128 
  Mean32 stands for the means where DRAW = 32; Mean64 stands for the means where   
DRAW = 64; Means128 stands for the means where DRAW = 128.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by ATp Tour, 1995.
From table 3 we can conclude the following. First, the spread level between the 
rounds increases, but at a decreasing rate. By observing columns 3, 5, and 7 in table 
3, % change between spread levels decreases. The largest spread effect is in the 
first rounds of the tournaments, and thereafter diminishes. Usually, purse amount is 
highly and positively correlated with the size of the draw, bigger draw, larger total 
purse, but holding the total purse constant, the percent change between the spread 
levels in a 32-draw tournament decreases faster than in the 64-draw tournament, than 
in the 128-draw tournament. Second, in all three tournament settings (32, 64, and 
128) the final interrank spread drops. Thus the percentage change in the final spread 
level, between a finalist’s and winner’s payoff has a negative sign. The final spread 
is actually lower than the previous one.Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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From table 4 results are somewhat different. This table observes changes between 
prize levels instead of spreads per round. Again, in 32-draw tournaments first round 
provides the largest percent difference between prizes. For the 64-draw tournaments 
the largest percent difference occurs in the second round. In the case of the 128-draw 
tournaments, largest percent change occurs in the third round and again in the semi-
finals. Second, by observing columns 3, 5, and 7 it is easy to notice a relative linear 
increase between prize levels. Thus, pRIZDIFi increases at the constant rate through-
out a tournament. Only a small drop in the difference of prize levels is noticeable in 
the final round of 128-draw tournaments, however insignificant.
Figures 1 and 2 represent the results from tables 3 and 4. Figure 1 shows the relation-
ship between spread levels and the percent change among them over seven rounds of 
a tournament. As the figure illustrates, SPREADi for all three types of tournaments 
increases at the decreasing rate up to the final round and than it drops. Percentage 
change among SpREADi throughout a tournament for all three types of tournaments 
shows more significantly this negative trend between spread levels. Figure 2 illus-
trates a trend for pRZDIFi and percentage change between pRZDIFi across tourna-
ment rounds. Changes between pRIZDIFi are rather linear across the rounds for all 
three types of tournaments. From percentage changes among pRZDIFi it is obvious 
that level of difference in the final round does not have a distinctive jump, on the 
contrary, it drops somewhat. 
From the above tables and figures 1 and 2 all the results point toward rejecting the first 
hypothesis. Most of the empirical papers did not test this proposition, thus it is impos-
sible to compare my results with other findings. However, spread level in Rosen’s 
sense, and even the prize level, is not structured in a way that satisfies theoretical 
claims. Major deviation from the theory, in my opinion, is the result we obtain from 
tables and figure 1 on the final interrank spread. It does not show any distinct increase, 
on the contrary, it drops. Under this circumstance we should expect to see the lowest 
amount of effort supplied in the finals, since spread level is not set in a way to make a 
tournament a non-ending game. Expected payoff, under current conditions, decreases 
as the number of rounds left to be played decreases. We can think of two possible 
reasons that explain this tournament setting. First, purse level and at the same time, 
prize levels increased by more than 15% since ATp Tour started to run the Tour in 
1990. This increase in money was even higher in 1992 and 1993, years of our data set, 
comparing it to 1989, last year Tour was run by the International Tennis Federation. 
Thus, an increase in earnings caused an increase in entry of good players, supply curve 
of professional player’s shifts to the right, and, on the other hand, current players in 
order to successfully compete and earn higher available rents, needed to improve their 
game. Cost associated with effort level did increase as well as the benefits associated 
with higher prizes. With that in mind, players’ responsiveness to the different spread 
levels might not be as elastic as it was prior to 1990. We can argue that new entrants 
are young players who are less responsive to spread, and even though spreads are 
not increasing at some constant rate, they are motivated to compete because winning Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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increases their total earnings. On the other hand, older players will have to compete 
hard to be able to maintain their ranking. Second hypothesis will address the issue of 
spread and effort level in a more detailed fashion. Second reason for this anomaly, 
larger spread in the semi-finals than in the finals, could be associated with the reputa-
tion effect. Once players reach a final round, winning a title earns them more than 
just prize money. They also obtain a certain level of utility from wining a title, which 
is the goal of their profession, ATp Tour points, which help increase their ranking, 
bonuses on their endorsement deals and new endorsement deals, invitations for ex-
hibition matches, and other pecuniary benefits. Including all of these benefits, which 
posses the monetary value and certainly complement the prize earnings, they perhaps 
offset the low spread in the finals. The problem with this argument is that a drop in the 
spread in the final round could be understandable for a tournament like Wimbledon, 
which is perhaps the most popular tournament among public. But, observing table 3, 
columns 3 and 7, which compare percentage difference among spreads between small 
tournaments (32 draw) and Majors (128 draw) we can see that small tournaments pro-
vide lower percentage change among different spreads, and in the final round, spread 
drops at the larger rate than is the case with large tournaments. It is hard to assume that 
winning a small tournament provides higher level utility (reputation) for a player vis-
à-vis winning a Major tournament. Opposite result than the one from table 3 would be 
more reasonable. In small tournaments, DRAW = 32, some players receive guarantees 
to show-up and play. Dollar amount of these guarantees is not publicly available, but 
it is known that many times that amount is larger than the amount of money winner of 
the tournament receives. Perhaps, small tournament can offer small spread in the final 
round, since they have other means of securing good players. On the other hand, it is in 
players’ interest to perform well, or, in the long-run, benefits associated with marquee 
name will vanish. However, the fact is that players gain more than just the prize money 
by winning a tournament or finishing very high. Again, test of second hypothesis will 
answer more on questions related to spread and effort level.
5.2. Test of hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 states that in the tennis tournaments top four ranks receive about 50% 
of total purse available. In other words, two semifinalists, finalist and a winner should 
receive about half of the total purse in prize money. This statement just supplements 
the assumption that spread level should increase as someone advances to the final 
two rounds, otherwise disincentive may prevail in a tournament setting. 
We looked at the top three prize levels, winner, finalist, and 2 semifinalists, and 
compared their earnings to the total tournament purse. Tournament’s purse depends 
not only on the DRAW size, but also on the FIELD. I created means of prizes for 32, 
48, 53, 56, 64, 96, and 128 FIELD tournaments. By adding up top three prizes and 
dividing them by the pDpURSE, we got the percentage of earnings for the top four 
ranks. Tables 5 and 6 summarize the information needed.Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Table 5: Means, pDpURSE, and %TpDpURSE for tournaments
Variable Mean32 Mean48 Mean53 Mean56 Mean64
PRIZE1 49.6950 155.1286 152.0000 157.4762 209.8500
PRIZE2 28.9900 83.5964 80.5000 83.0121 110.3000
PRIZE3 16.9588 45.0321 42.5000 43.8629 58.1525
pRIZE4 9.8696 24.3964 22.5000 23.0881 30.6050
pRIZE5 6.7487 12.8486 11.7500 12.2374 16.1485
pRIZE6 5.3410 7.0421 6.2000 6.4338 8.5550
pRIZE7 0.0000 3.9250 3.2000 3.4036 4.5700
pRIZE8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PDPURSE 252.7589 704.6379 667.9000 703.0921 971.1830
%TPDPURSE 37.8400 40.2700 41.1700 40.4400 38.9500
Note: FIELD = 32, 48, 53, 56, 64., and n = 120, 14, 1, 21, 2 
  Mean32 stands for prize level means when FIELD = 32; Mean48 stands for prize level means 
when FIELD = 48, Mean53 stands for prize level means when FIELD = 53; Mean56 stands 
for prize level means when FIELD = 56; and Mean64 stands for prize level means when   
FIELD = 64. %TpDpURSE stands for the percent of total purse under different FIELDs.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by ATp Tour, 1995.
Table 6: Means, %TpDpURSE, and pDpURSE
Variable Mean96 Mean128
PRIZE1 202,9500 447,4933
PRIZE2 106,7650 224,2460
PRIZE3 56,1500 111,8730
pRIZE4 29,5475 58,3993
pRIZE5 15,5300 31,3416
pRIZE6 8,1750 18,1123
pRIZE7 4,3550 11,0635
pRIZE8 2,3100 6,7026
PDPURSE 1008,5300 2452,6100
%TPDPURSE 36,2800 31,9500
Note: FORMAT = 96 and 128, and n = 2 and 8 
  Mean96 stands for means of prizes when FORMAT = 96; Mean128 stands for means of 
prizes when FORMAT = 128; %TpDpURSE stands for percent of pDpURSE for different 
FIELDS.
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by ATp Tour, 1995.Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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From tables 5 and 6, it is easy to observe that top four ranked players in tournaments 
organized by the ATp do not receive around 50% of the total purse. Actually, they 
receive much less. Most of the tournaments under different FORMATS offer around 
40% of the total purse to the last four players left in the tournament, two semifinal-
ists, one finalist, and one winner. It is interesting to see that in tournaments where 
FORMAT = 128, table 6, last four players left in the tournament receive less in 
terms of the percentage of the total purse than in any other FORMAT tournament. 
Tournaments where FORMAT = 53 offer the largest percentage of total purse to the 
top 4 performers left in a tournament, 41.17%. Thus, results point to rejection of hy-
pothesis 2. professional tennis tournaments are not structured according to Rosen’s 
theory, and we will present later if current tournament structure affects the quality 
of play, and ultimately the profits of tournament owners (organizers). Similar argu-
ments could be applied in this section as they were applied in the previous section. 
If we observe high effort level under current tournament setting, we should conclude 
that players’ performance and effort level that they supply during play depends on 
more variables than just the spread level. Perhaps other pecuniary benefits are im-
portant as well. 
5.3. Test of hypothesis 3
Third hypothesis states that as the spread level increases, effort level provided by 
the players will increase. Empirical results from sport arenas show that increase in 
prize money available for a certain place will induce individuals to perform better, 
they will run faster, shot lower score on the golf field, race cars faster, and so on. A 
player’s decision on how much effort he is willing to supply will depend on marginal 
benefits he will obtain vis-à-vis marginal costs. However, the amount of effort he 
will need to supply will depend on his ability and the ability of his possible oppo-
nents. Another complication is associated with value of advancing, which depends 
on how the player assesses future effort should eligibility be maintained. According 
to Rosen, the value of maintaining eligibility at any stage is the sure prize the player 
has guaranteed by surviving that long, plus the discounted sum of successive inter-
rank rewards that may be achieved in future matches (1986). This is what we call 
a spread. Given the spread, every player will decide on his optimal effort level in 
order to maximize the utility. Output function will also depend on the ability of the 
players that he may confront during a tournament, and his own current form. Finally, 
effort level will be influenced by what Nalebuff and Stiglitz call, an environmental 
variable. In tennis tournaments environmental variable could represent the surface 
on which the tournament is held, or the format of the match, is it best of three sets or 
best of five sets match. Thus, in particular, we can write the equation that represents 
second hypothesis as:
µji = ƒ {[Wis - Wi(s+1)], γji, γjo } + θi + εji  (1).Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Here µji stands for pair of individuals js’ score in a match i, Wis - Wi(s+1) stands for 
the spread, or the marginal reward for advancing one place in the final ranking in a 
match i where the number of stages remaining to be played is s. γji and γjo are mea-
sures of the player’s own ability and his competitor’s ability, θi reflects the tourna-
ment specific factors, like format and surface, and εji is a random error term. First 
variable we used to estimate the effort level is variable TIME. From equation (1) we 
constructed the following regression:
TIMEji = α0 + α1SpREADi + α2RANKWGHT + α3RANKDIFF +  
+ α4SURFACEi + α5FORMATi + ηj  (2).
TIMEji measures the time of the match i between a pair of players j in minutes. 
SpREADi measures the marginal reward for advancing one place in the final ranking 
in a match i, RANKWGHT measures the level of the ability present in the matches, 
and it is derived as the summation of rankings among paired players. RANKDIFF 
is the absolute value of the difference in a ranking between two players, which also 
measures the level of ability among pairs of players. SURFACEi stands for the type 
of surface matches are played on. There are four types of surface, carpet, clay, grass, 
and hard. These are constructed as dummy variables that take on values 0 or 1. Base 
variable is hard. Variable FORMATi reflects to the type of the scoring system, two 
out of three sets or best of three (3), and three out of five sets, or best of five (5). 
FORMATi is also constructed as the dummy variable that takes on values 0 and 1. 
Base is best of five (5) matches. Results in table 7 also include the same regression 
as (1), but one of the independent variables is pRZDIFFi. pRZDIFFi measures only 
the numerical difference between two prizes. Thus,
TIMEji = α0 + α1pRZDIFFi + α2RANKWGHT + α3RANKDIFF +  
+ α4SURFACEi +α5FORMATi + ηij   (3).
Let us focus our attention to the table XV.
Table 7, column (1) presents estimates of the equation (2). As the spread level in-
creases, time of the match increases as well. If time is some accurate proxy for the ef-
fort level, this finding supports theory based on tournament model. For every increase 
in spread, for let say $100, time of the match goes up by 6 minutes. We can also see 
that if the difference in ranking among pairs of players increases, matches will last 
shorter time period, which is reasonable since it is expected that better players beat 
lower ranked players faster. On the other hand, as the RANKWGHT increases, time 
of the match will last longer. Again, RANKWGHT measures the quality of the draw, 
the quality of participants in a tournament. Better players will have higher ranking, 
which in turn means lower numerical position, number 1, number 2, and so on. Thus, 
as the number on RANKWGHT gets lower, higher ranked players are participating, 
and the opposite, as the number gets higher, lower ranked players are participating. Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Table 7: Effort level equations for the 1992-93 ATp Tour
Variable (1) (2)
Intercept 148,4903 (63,3700) 150,4650 (74,7200)
SURFACE        
Carpet -0,6942 (0,5300) -0,5085 (0,3900)
Clay 4,4711 (4,3700) 4,3727 (4,2800)
Grass 6,5170 (0,3580) -6,6083 (3,6300)
Hard        
FORMAT        
3 .51.5508 (26,6500) -52,7438 (29,2900)
5        
RANKWGHT 0,0132 (2,4500) 0,0115 (2,1800)
RANKDIFF -0,0280 (3,9200) -0,0266 (3,7600)
SpREAD 0,0607 (2,6600)    
pRZDIFF     0,0896 (2,2800)
R2  (1) 0,1679      
R2  (2)     0,1675  
F value 149,5000   149,1700  
n 5195,0000   5195,0000  
Note: Dependent variable = Time. Statistics are derived from match play in a tournament. Abso-
lute value t-statistics in parentheses. 
  SURFACE: Hard = 0, otherwise 1.
  FORMAT: 5 = 0, otherwise 1.
  RANKWGHT: Σ (ranki + ranko) where i stands for one player and o for his opponent in a 
match.
  RANKDIFF: |ranki - ranko| where i and o stand for a pair of players in a match.
  SpREAD: marginal expected prize for winning in a round i, where i = 1,..., 7.
  pRZDIFF: difference between two prizes in round i, where i = 1,..., 7.
  R sq. values are adjusted for d.o.f. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the ATp Tour, 1995.
Sign on the variable is positive and significant, thus we can only conclude that draws 
containing lower ranked players produce matches that last long time. This can be 
true especially in tournaments with smaller purse where only a small number of top 
players enter, and even though they win fast, majority of matches takes longer time 
to complete since lower ranked but even in the ability players confront each other. 
Matches played under format 5 and on the hard surface last longer in general than 
matches played under format 3 on the hard surface. Only matches that are played on 
the clay surface last longer than on the hard surface. 
Table 7, column (2) presents estimates of the equation (3). Signs in column (2) do not 
differ from the signs in column (1). Most of the results are very close. Again we see Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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that effort level also depends on the difference in prizes by round (pRZDIFF) as well 
as it was the case with variable spread. As the difference in two prizes increase by 
$100, time of the match increases by about 9 minutes. Under the SpREAD variable 
this increase is lower, which could possible suggest that players are more sensitive 
to immediate reward, they look only at the current payoff instead of all the future 
possible payoffs. 
Table 8 offers three new equations similar to the equation (2), but with different de-
pendent variables. Table 8 includes three dependent variables, which should proxy 
the effort level, GAMES, pOINTS, and ppG. Regressions from table 8 are derived 
from the same equation as (2) except different dependent variable was used. For in-
stance, ppGi measures the number of games played in a game in match i. We assume 
more effort is supplied, and more entertaining match will be as the number of games 
or points is played, since it makes the match closer.
Table 8: Effort level equations for the 1992-93 ATp Tour
Variable  
(dependent)
GAMES pOINTS ppG
(independent) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 34,8674 (116,1300) 242,7574 (108,8700) 6,9368 (231,9800)
SURFACE
Carpet 0,6842 (3,0100) 3,0740 (1,8200) -0,0508 (2,2500)
Clay -0,2005 (1,1600) -0,0402 (0,0300) 0,0605 (3,5200)
Grass 10,7400 (3,7600) 8,2989 (3,9200) 0,0133 (0,4700)
Hard
FORMAT
3 -12,6474 (52,5400) -99,3288 (55,5556) -0,4980 (20,7700)
5
RANKWGHT 0,0018 (1,9800) 0,0165 (2,4444) 0,0002 (2,5300)
RANKDIFF -0,0044 (3,6100) -0,0345 (3,8300) -0,0003 (2,6400)
SpREAD 0,0072 (2,1400) 0,0673 (2,6800) 0,0005 (1,4900)
R2 0,3710 0,3989 0,0892
F value 565,1000 635,9000 93,8500
n 6714,0000 6714,0000 6714,0000
Note: Dependent variables are 1. GAMESi, 2. pOINTSi, 3. ppGi. Statistics are derived for match 
play in a tournament. Absolute value t-statistics in parentheses. Gamesi: total number of 
games played in a match i.
  pointsi: total number of points played in a match i.
  ppgi: total number of points per game played in a match i.
  R-sq. adjusted for d.o.f. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the ATp Tour, 1995.Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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Column (1) in table 8 provides us with estimates using variable GAMES as a depen-
dent variable. We can see again that variable SPREAD is positive and significant. For 
every increase in spread by $1,000 players play additional 7 games, or the matches 
get closer, in a sense. Matches played in the best of five format on hard courts last 
longer than matches played in the best of three format on same type of surface. It is 
interesting to point that matches played on grass and carpet last longer, holding other 
things constant, than matches played on the clay surface. T-statistic on surface clay 
is not significant. This is true for both formats. One possible explanation for this is 
that it is much easier to win own service game on fast surfaces like carpet or grass 
than on a slow surface like clay. Therefore, we observe a fact that more games are 
played on faster surfaces, but also from table 7, that matches played on fast surfaces 
last shorter period of time. Difference in ranking variable has a negative sign and 
it is significant. As the difference in ranking between two players increases, lower 
number of games is played. For example, for an increase of 100 in absolute ranking 
difference, 0.4 or almost 1 game is played less. Variable representing the level of the 
ability among players, RANKWGHT, has positive sign and significant coefficient. 
As the ranking decreases among the players, number of games played decreases as 
well. We found this result to be consistent with the result from table 7. Thus, under 
the assumption that GAMES proxy some effort level efficiently, not necessarily will 
draws filled with high ranked players produce matches that result in a large number 
of games, and perhaps more entertaining.
Column (2) from table 8 shows regression estimates using pOINTS, total number 
of points played in a match i, as a dependent variable. Column (2) produces similar 
results as column (1). If we increase the spread by $100, number of points played 
in a match increases by 6. Even though variable clay is insignificant, sign points out 
that more points is played on faster surfaces. We should take this statement with 
caution since variable carpet is not very significant, and perhaps variable POINTS is 
affected by the total number of games played. If we focus our attention to the column 
(3) where dependent variable is ppG, points per game, we can see that actually more 
points per game is played on clay than any other surface. The strange result from 
column (2) is that just less games is played on clay, and thus less points. Spread vari-
able does not result in a significant t-statistic; however, it shows that for an increase 
of $10,000 in spread there will be an increase of 5 points per game. Other results are 
consistent with results from columns (1) and (2).
Table 9 illustrates the regressions using variables ACES, BRKpTS, and BREAKS as 
dependent variables. Again, variable BRKpTS was constructed in a way to measure 
both players output. This was not done for the variable ACES, since even if one 
player serves hard, we assume that he is doing that because his opponent is tough as 
well. Also, some players are better returners of the serve than their opponents, which 
will reduce the number of aces for the opponent who still tries hard. Regressions Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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presented in table 9 were derived from the same equation like (1) using different 
dependent variables.
Table 9: Effort level equations for the 1992-93 ATp Tour
Variable  
(dependent) ACES BREAKpTS BREAKS
(independent) (1) (2) (3)
Intercept 12,6582 (45,2600) 7,6250 (47,1200) 8,3783 (64,2100)
SURFACE
Carpet 3,4528 (16,3300) 0,4947 (4,0400) 0,7934 (8,0500)
Clay -2,8862 (17,9800) 0,5745 (6,1900) 0,8808 (11,7600)
Grass 2,7950 (10,5100) -1,0878 (7,0700) -1,1685 (9,4200)
Hard
FORMAT
3 -12,6474 (52,5400) -99,3288 (55,5556) -0,4980 (20,7700)
5
RANKWGHT -0,0026 (3,1100) 0,0020 (3,9900) 0,0019 (4,7200)
RANKDIFF 0,0004 (0,3100) -0,0033 (5,1200) -0,0016 (3,0300)
SpREAD 0,0274 (8,7000) -0,0058 (3,1900) -0,0046 (3,1300)
R2 0,2377 0,1021 0,1701
F value 298,8100 108,9800 196,4400
n 6714,0000 6714,0000 6714,0000
Note: Dependent variables are 1. ACES, 2. BRKpTS, 3. BREAKS. Statistics are derived from 
match play in a tournament. Absolute value t-statistics in parentheses. 
  Aces: total number of aces served either on the first or the second serve in the match.
  Brkpts: total number of paired break points in a match.
  Breaks: total number of converted break points into a game.
  R square adjusted for d.o.f. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from data provided by the ATp Tour, 1995.
Table 9, column (1) are illustrating results from the regression (2) where ACES is 
the dependent variable. If number of ACES in a match measure effort level by two 
players, it is strongly dependent on the variable SpREAD. For an increase of $1000 
in spread, number of aces served in a match increases by 27 aces. Column (2) of the 
table 9 presents regression where number of paired break points is a dependable vari-
able, BRKPTS. SPREAD is significant and it has negative coefficient. This implies 
that as the level of spread increases, players earn lower number of break opportuni-
ties. We have seen from column (1) that the number of aces increases as the spread 
level increases, which in a sense supports the above statement that as the spread level 
increases players play much harder on their serve, and we see less breaks. This is Miren Ivankovic • The tournament model: an empirical investigation... 
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telling us, also, that good returns will be crucial in winning matches where spreads 
are very high. Regression using dependent variable BREAKS, in column (3), gives 
similar results as column (2). Coefficients on the variables that proxy ability level are 
consistent with column (2).
From the above regressions, tables 7, 8, and 9, results are significantly and consis-
tently pointing toward accepting the second hypothesis. We conclude that spread level 
will positively influence players to supply effort in professional tennis tournaments.   
This finding is consistent with other findings derived from analysis using sport data.
6. Conclusion and extension
We focused in this paper on two major issues: 1. does the level of spread matter in 
determining the efficient amount of effort supplied, and 2. we looked into the struc-
ture of spreads among professional tennis tournaments and analyzed it along the 
lines of theoretical work.
We found that spread level in a tennis tournament on the ATp Tour is not structured 
in the efficient way as the tournament theory would suggest. Basically, spread level 
increases at the decreasing rate, and the amount devoted for the final spread de-
creases in percentage terms, instead the opposite. Both findings contradict the theory. 
However, even though poorly structured, changes in spread level in ATp Tour tour-
naments do cause direct changes in the effort level supplied by the players. As the 
spread increases we see players trying harder.
This is just a marginal contribution to a relatively small literature available regard-
ing tournament analysis. Trying to understand how to obtain and manipulate data 
from the firm’s labor environment should be a major concern and task of the future 
research.
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Turnir Model: Statistička investigacija ATP
Miren Ivankovic1
Sažetak
U konkurentnim tržištima, radna snaga plaćena je prema vrijednosti svoga rada. 
Ali kad usporedimo plaće visoko pozicioniranih menadžera, razlike u plaćama vrlo 
su velike. Svakako da su razlike u naknadama potrebne da bi se dao poticaj za 
postizanje najboljih rezultata od samog početka građenja menadžerske karijere. 
Međutim, struktura novčanih nagrada prema postignutim rezultatima u profesion-
alnom teniskom turniru ne korespondira teoriji turnira. Raspodjela novčanih na-
grada prema rezultatima raste, ali po padajućoj stopi, te tako u finalnom kolu, vi-
sina novčane nagrade se smanjuje. Postotak promjene u visini novčane nagrade 
veći je u polufinalu nego li u finalu. U skladu s tim, četiri vrhunska teniska igrača 
u završnom kolu dobivaju samo 40% umjesto najmanje 50% od ukupnog fonda 
nagrada. Rezultati iz ekonometrijske radnje ukazuju na razlike u povezivanju re-
zultata rada s plaćama i ukupnim fondom nagrada. Međutim, rezultati nisu uvjer-
ljivi, jer u nekim slučajevima, nagrađivanje truda statistički se temelji na ukupnom 
fondu nagrada umjesto na nagrađivanju prema postignutim rezultatima, dok se u 
drugim slučajevima temelji i na nagrađivanju prema postignutim rezultatima i ra-
spodjeli ukupnog fonda nagrada, što je u suprotnosti s teorijama o turnirima. 
Ključne riječi: model turnira, plaće, trud, teniski turnir
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